신(新)기후 변화 체제
New Climate Change Regime , 新氣候變化體制
교토의정서에 기반한 현재의 기후변화 대응 체제의 한계를 극복하고, 선진국과 개도국이 모두 참여하는 2020년 이후(Post-2020)의 새로운 기후변화 대응 체제. 2015년 12월 프랑스 파리에서 열리는 21차 UN기후변화협약 당사국 총회에서 최종 타결 여부가 결정된다.
신(新) 기후변화 체제
2015년 12월 파리에서 열리는 제21차 UN기후변화협약각주[1] 당사국 총회(COP21)에서는 현재의 교토의정서보다 더 실효성 있게 기후 변화에 대응할 수 있는 신기후체제를 출범시킬 예정이다. 기존의 교토의정서와 달리 신기후체제에서는 선진국은 물론 개도국도 감축의무를 지고 있다.
당사국총회 (COP : Conference of the Parties)
UN 기후변화협약 관련 최고 의사결정기구. 당사국들은 1995년부터 매년 말 당사국총회를 열어 협약의 협약의 이행방법 등 주요 사안들을 논의하고 있다. 1997년 일본 교토에서 열린 2차 총회에서 교토의정서(Kyoto Protocol)을 채택했다.
교토의정서 체제는 '공통의, 그러나 차이 있는 책임(Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, CBRD)'을 명시한 UN기후변화협약에 따라 선진국에 온실가스 감축 의무를 부과했다. 현재의 기후 변화문제가 지금까지 선진국의 경제 발전에 의해 일어났기 대문에 선진국과 개발도상국 간 책임에 차이가 있음을 인정한다는 취지다.
이에 따라 교토의정서 체제는 한국과 멕시코를 제외한 OECD 국가, 유럽연합, 동유럽국가 등 부속서Ⅰ 국가들에게 2008~2012년(1차 공약기간) 사이에 온실가스 총 배출량을 1990년 수준보다 평균 5.2퍼센트 감축해야 한다는 의무를 부과했다. 나머지 개도국 국가들은 자율적 참여를 하기로 했다.
교토의정서의 한계
그러나 실제 이행 과정은 결코 순탄치 않았다. 선진국과 개도국 간의 첨예한 의견 대립이 계속 불거졌고, 협약 이행의 발목을 잡았다. 교토의정서가 채택되기 전까지도 목표, 일정, 개도국의 참여 여부 등을 두고 상당한 갈등을 겪었고, 2001년 3월에는 세계 최대 온실가스 배출국인 미국이 탈퇴하면서 교토의정서 체제가 크게 흔들렸다.
미국은 교토의정서가 자국 경제에 심각한 피해를 줄 수 있고 중국·인도 등 개발도상국이 의무감축 대상에서 제외되어 있다는 이유로 반대 입장을 표명했다. 결국 교토의정서 체제는 CO₂ 배출량 1,2위 국가인 중국(26%)과 미국(16%)이 의무감축 대상에 들어가지 않게 됐다.
게다가 신기후변화체제가 출범하기 전까지 과도기적 성격으로 설정된 교토의정서 제2차 공약기간(2013~2020년)에는 제1차 공약기간 참여국이었던 캐나다가 탈퇴하고 러시아, 일본, 뉴질랜드 등도 불참을 선언하면서 사실상 유명무실해졌다. 이로써 교토의정서 제2차 공약기간 참여국의 배출량 총량은 전세계 온실가스 배출량의 약 15%에 불과하다.
더반 플랫폼 : 신기후변화체제 협상 시작
교토의정서의 후속 체제 출범을 두고도 선진국과 개도국 간의 갈등이 컸다. 당초 2007년 발리총회(COP13)는 교토의정서 1차 공약기간이 종료되면, 교토의정서에 참여하지 않은 선진국과 개도국까지 참여시키는 2012 이후 체제(POST-2012체제)를 2009년 코펜하겐총회(COP15)에서 출범시키기로 합의했다. 그러나 선진국과 개도국의 해묵은 갈등으로 코펜하겐 총회는 성과를 내지 못한 채 폐회됐다.
2011년 더반총회(COP17)에서 변화의 물꼬가 트였다. 더반총회에서는 선진국과 개도국이 모두 참여하는 포괄적 감축체제 협상 출범에 합의하는 '더반 플랫폼'이 도출됐다. 2015년 12월 당사국총회까지 신(新)기후변화 체제를 성립하고 2020년부터 발효한다는 로드맵도 내놨다.
신기후변화체제는 모든 국가가 광범위하게 참여하는 유연한 체제를 표방한다. 2013년 개최된 제19차 당사국총회(COP19)에서는 2020년 이후 기후변화 대응을 위한 기여방안과 관련해 교토의정서 상의 하향식(top-down) 방식 대신에 당사국들이 국별 상황을 감안하여 '국가별 기여방안(INDC:intended nationally determined contributions)를 자체적으로 결정해 제출하기로 합의했다.
각 국은 국가별 기여방안과 함께 기준년도, 기간, 범위, 계획절차, 가정, 방법론, 국가별 상황 등에 대한 정보를 제출하기로 합의했다. 기여 방안 보고서는 2015년 개최되는 제21차 당사국총회 한참 이전에(well in advance) 제출하되 준비된 국가들은 2014년 1/4분기에 제출하도록 요구했다. 각국이 제출한 INDC는 기후변화협약 홈페이지에 게재되며 사무국은 10월 1일까지 제출한 기여방안들의 총량적 효과를 분석한 종합 보고서를 11월 1일 발표할 예정이다.
신(新) 기후변화체제 협상의 최종 타결 여부를 가름하는 21차 당사국총회는 2015년 11월 30일부터 12월 11일까지 프랑스 파리에서 열릴 예정이다.
미-중 정상회담, 온실가스 감축 합의
세계 최대 온실가스 배출국인 미국과 중국은 2014년 11월 베이징에성 열린 양국 정상회담에서 온실가스 감축 합의를 만들어냈다. 양국은 지구 총 탄소배출의 42퍼센트에 달하는 탄소를 배출하는 거대 탄소 배출자들로서 2013년 세계 탄소 배출양의 거의 절반을 이 두 국가가 배출했다.
미국은 2025년까지 2005년 수준의 26~28퍼센트의 탄소감축을 하고, 중국은 2030년 이후에는 더 이상 탄소 배출을 늘리지 않기로 했다. 교토의정서 탈퇴 이후 기후변화체제를 외면해온 미국과 그간 탄소 감축 관련 계획을 내놓지 않아온 중국의 합의로 기후변화대응 체제 설립이 탄력을 받을 것으로 기대된다.
국가별 기여방안(INDC)
2015년 8월 20일 기준 세계 56개 나라가 UN에 기여계획(INDC)를 제출한 상태다. 미국, EU 등은 2015년 3월에 제출했으며 한국과 중국 등은 6월에, 일본은 7월에 제출했다.
한국은 2030년 온실가스 배출전망치(BAU)의 25.7%를 국내에서 감축하고 11.3%를 국외에서 감축해 총 37%(3억1473만톤)를 감축하겠다는 목표를 확정해 2015년 6월 30일 제출했다. 부문별, 업종별, 연도별 감축 목표를 설정하는 세부 이행계획도 수립해야 한다.
한국 정부는 2009년 15차 총회에서 자발적으로 2020년까지 BAU 대비 30% 감축하겠다는 목표를 밝힌바 있다. 그러나 2015년 INDC에서 밝힌 계획은 기존 2020년 목표 배출량 5억 4300만톤과 비교했을 때 불과 700만톤 밖에 차이가 나지 않는데다, 37%의 감축분 중 30%에 해당하는 11.3%는 해외시장에서 사온 배출권으로 충당한다는 계획이라 비판이 높다.
국내의 환경단체는 "INDC의 후퇴금지 원칙(No Back sliding)를 위반했다"고 비판했다. 후퇴금지원칙은 기존에 발표됐던 계획안보다 의욕적이어야 한다는 원칙이다. 각국의 INDC를 분석하는 국제연구단체 컨소시엄(CAT Consortium)도 “국제사회 공동의 노력에 부합하지 않는 부적절한(inadequate) 목표”라고 지적했다
| 국가 | 온실가스 감축 목표 | 배출량 비중(2012년 기준) |
|---|---|---|
| 중국 | 2030년까지 2005년 에너지원단위 대비 60~65% 감축 | 24.5% |
| 미국 | 2025년까지 2005년 대비 26~28% 감축 | 13.9% |
| 유럽연합 | 2030년까지 1990년 대비 최소 40% 감축 | 9.8% |
| 러시아 | 2030년까지 1990년 대비 25~30% 감축 | 5.2% |
| 일본 | 2030년까지 2013년 배출량 대비 26% 감축 | 3% |
| 멕시코 | 2030년까지 BAU 대비 25% 감축, 선진국 지원 시 40% 감축 | 1.6% |
| 한국 | 2030년까지 배출전망치(BAU) 대비 37% 감축 | 1.5% |
| 스위스 | 2030년까지 1990년 대비 50% 감축 | 0.11% |
신기후체제 협상 주요 쟁점
차별화 : 온실가스 감축 의무를 선진국과 개도국간 어떻게 차별화하여 적용할 것인가의 문제다. 개도국들은 역사적 책임, 그리고 '공통의 그러나 차별화된 책임(CBDR) 원칙' 및 개별국가의 능력에 기초해 기존 기후변화협약 상의 국가분류인 부속서 체제 (부속서 Ⅰ,Ⅱ )를 그대로 유지해야 한다는 입장이다. 선진국들은 부속서 체제가 1992년 기후변화협약 채택 당시의 상황을 기준으로 하고 있으므로 지난 20여 년간 변화된 각국의 상황을 반영해 수정되어야 한다고 주장한다.
법적 성격 : 각국이 제출한 INDC의 이행에 법적 구속력을 부여할 것인가를 두고 이견이 있다. EU 및 군소도서국연합(AOSIS) 등 기후변화 대응을 위한 적극적인 노력을 강조하는 국가들은 INDC 내용의 이행 자체에도 법적 구속력을 부여해야 한다고 주장한다. 반면 미국, 호주 등은 INDC에 법적 구속력을 부여할 경우 신기후체제에 많은 국가들의 참여를 저해할 수 있다며 국내법을 통해 이행을 확보하면 된다고 본다.
기후 재원 : 개도국들은 선진국들의 역사적 책임을 강조하면서 선진국들에게 온실가스 감축 및 기후변화 적응 노력에 대한 예측 가능하면서도 구체적인 기후재원 지원 확대를 요구하고 있다. 이에 대해 선진국들은 합의문에 구체적 수치를 포함하기는 어렵다는 입장이며, 개도국들이 국내적 정책 및 제도 구축 등을 이행해야 한다고 주장한다.
□ 녹색기후기금(Green Climate Fund, GCF) :
개발도상국의 온실가스 감축과 기후변화 적응을 지원하는 최초의 기후변화 특화 기금으로 2010년 칸쿤총회(COP16)에서 선진국들이 2012년부터 2020년까지 연간 1000억 달러의 재원을 조성하기로 합의했다. 이사회는 미국, 독일, 러시아, 일본 등 선진국 12개국과 중국, 인도, 멕시코 등 개도국 12개 국가로 이뤄지고, 사무국은 대한민국 인천 송도에 있다.
각주
UN기후변화협약 : 1992년 브라질 리우데자네이루에서 개최된 UN 환경개발회의에서 채택한 협약으로 온실가스 방출을 제한해 지구 온난화를 방지하는 데 목적이 있다. 가입국은 총 196개국으로 지구 상 거의 모든 나라가 참여하고 있는 셈이다
참고문헌
- 기후변화 바로알기 2015, 외교부 기후변화환경과, 2015년 5월
http://goo.gl/JBDrpQ - 신기후변화체제 하에서 한국의 대응 전략, KIEP 정책연구 브리핑, 대외경제정책연구원, 2012년 7월
- Post-2020 신기후체제 국가별 INDCs 현황, 기후변화행동연구소, 2015.5
http://goo.gl/QeoG52 - Post-2020 온실가스 감축 목표의 문제점 : 한국 INDC 평가, 아산정책연구원, 이슈브리프
http://goo.gl/68uK6m
rel.
기후변화 바로알기 2015.pdf□ 제목 : 기후변화 바로알기 2015 [Frequently Asked Questions]
□ 목차 :
1. 기후변화의 이해
2. 기후변화협약 및 교토의정서
3. Post-2020 신(新)기후변화협상체제 협상
4. 국제사회의 다양한 노력
5. 한국의 기후변화 대응 노력
6. 부록
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미 외교 협의회
The Global Climate Change Regime
Issue Brief : http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831
Scope of the Challenge
Climate change is one of the most significant threats facing the world today. According to the American Meteorological Society, there is a 90 percent probability that global temperatures will rise by 3.5 to 7.4 degrees Celsius (6.3 to 13.3 degrees Fahrenheit) in less than one hundred years, with even greater increases over land and the poles. These seemingly minor shifts in temperature could trigger widespread disasters in the form of rising sea levels, violent and volatile weather patterns, desertification, famine, water shortages, and other secondary effects including conflict. In November 2011, the International Energy Agency warned that the world may be fast approaching a tipping point concerning climate change, and suggested that the next five years will be crucial for greenhouse gas reduction efforts.
Avoiding the worst consequences of climate change will require large cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions. Humans produce greenhouse gases by burning coal, oil, and natural gas to generate energy for power, heat, industry, and transportation. Deforestationand agricultural activity also yield climate-changing emissions.
One way to reduce emissions would be to switch from fossil-fuel-based power to alternative sources of energy, such as nuclear, solar, and wind. A second, parallel option would be to achieve greater energy efficiency by developing new technologies and modifying daily behavior so each person produces a smaller carbon footprint. Additionally, retrofitting buildings and developing energy-efficient technology greatly help curb greenhouse gas emissions. All such measures, however, engender significant costs, and the onset of the global financial crisis has placed serious new constraints on national budgets both in the developed and developing worlds. Some climate change experts have expressed concern that the ongoing global financial crisis could defer action on climate change indefinitely.
Even if such reforms were implemented, substantial efforts will still be required to adapt to unavoidable change. Recent climate-related events, such as the flooding in Pakistan andThailand, have caused focus to fall on adaptation financing for developing countries, which could support infrastructure projects to protect vulnerable areas. Other efforts might include drought-tolerant farming.
Distribution of global emissions reinforces the need for broad multilateral cooperation in mitigating climate change. Fifteen to twenty countries are responsible for roughly 75 percent of global emissions, but no one country accounts for more than about 26 percent. Efforts to cut emissions—mitigation—must therefore be global. Without international cooperation and coordination, some states may free ride on others' efforts, or even exploit uneven emissions controls to gain competitive advantage. And because the impacts of climate change will be felt around the world, efforts to adapt to climate change—adaptation—will need to be global too.
At the launch of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changeseventeenth Conference of Parties (COP-17) in Durban, South Africa, many climate change experts were concerned that the Kyoto Protocol could expire in 2012 with no secondary legally binding accord on limiting global emissions in place. This fear, however, was somewhat assuaged as the nearly two hundred countries present at the COP-17 approved an extension of the protocol through 2017 and potentially 2020. A decision was also reached at the meeting to draft a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol by 2015, which would ultimately come into force in 2020. Delegates also envisioned that the new accord would include greenhouse gas emissions targets for all countries, regardless of their level of economic development. This framework notably contrasts with that of the Kyoto Protocol, which primarily focuses on reducing emissions emanating from developed countries.
Despite these and other marked successes during the COP-17, the perceived lack of leadership by central players in the climate change debate—especially the United States—has elicited increasing concern about the long term prospects of the global climate change regime. Additionally, Canada's December 2011 decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol—basedon domestic economic concerns as well as its view that the world's top greenhouse gas emitters have refused to ratify the accord—has generated concerns that the Kyoto Protocol itself may be in danger of collapse. Both of these concerns and many other issues will likely be a part of the agenda for the COP-18, scheduled for November 2012 in Qatar.
Strengths and Weaknesses
Overall assessment: An underdeveloped and inadequate system
The current centerpieces for multilateral action against climate change are the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its associatedKyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, and the COP-17 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action ("Durban Platform"). The Kyoto Protocol includes firm commitments to curb emissions only from developed countries, but does not include the United States, and has no meaningful consequences for noncompliance; it has also come under unprecedented strain as Canada officially withdrew from the accord in December 2011. Specifically, Canada's environment minister suggested Canada could only be a part of an accord which includes all major emitters as parties. As Japan and Russia could soon follow Canada's example, the hopes for a legally binding climate accord—even if desirable—may be fading. Additionally, the regime, which allows for numerous exemptions regarding greenhouse gas emissions, fails to provide emerging big emitters like China and India with meaningful targets and incentives to curb their emissions. The architecture for global climate governance looks particularly shaky after the fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP-15), in Copenhagen, failed to overcome entrenched differences among the major parties and deliver targeted emissions cuts. Following Copenhagen, COP-16, in Cancun, made some strides toward effective multilateral action, but the regime still falls well short of promoting needed action to effect positive change, including committing to a post–Kyoto framework.
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U.S. Climate Change Policy Issues
Introduction
The United States and the international community face a host of challenges on the domestic and international fronts in the attempt to build a more robust international climate regime. At home, progress has come to a virtual standstill after the failure of national cap-and-trade legislation. Abroad, the ultimate fate of the Kyoto Protocol looms large. The United States will need to decide whether to rely on state-by-state targets, participate in minilateral forums, or engage in multilateral negotiations for reducing emissions, among other questions. It must also decide whether it intends to pursue a legally binding climate agreement. Other policy issues straddle the domestic-international divide.
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Recent Developments
December 2013: GCF opens in Korea
In December 2013, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) opened its headquarters in Songdo, South Korea. The GCF was originally established as a result of the C0P-16 negotiations in Cancun, Mexico. It is designed to manage annual commitments that will escalate to a combined $100 billion by 2020 for adaptation. Developed countries have pledged to provide this assistance to developing countries to help them adapt to the impacts of climate change and achieve their own emissions reduction targets. Though the opening of a physical headquarters was a welcome first step, it remained difficult to determine whether contributions to date by developed countries were genuinely "additional" allocations to this effort, or simply reapportionment of previously allocated financial resources.
November 2013: COP-19 in Warsaw
In November 2013, the nineteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change convened in Warsaw, Poland. Longstanding disagreements between industrialized and developing countries continued to obstruct efforts to reach consensus on international emissions reduction targets. Still, the establishment of theWarsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage was a sign of progress. This mechanism may mobilize support for overcoming these disagreements between industrialized and developing countries by providing a substantive means for the former to render assistance to the latter for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. This momentum could prove critical to realizing the full potential of the 2014 COP in Lima, Peru and ultimately the 2015 COP in Paris, France.
September 2013: IPCCC publishes carbon budget
In September 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released a draft of its working group report that will ultimately be released as part of the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. The report articulated a target threshold of one million metric tons for the planet's human population in order to impede global warming in excess of 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit from a preindustrial baseline. If warming exceeds that temperature, the panel warned of perilous consequences across the entirety of the climate system. Remarkably, the IPCC estimates the remainder of this "carbon budget" will be completely expended by the year 2045. Indeed, the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration of the United States earlier the same year logged measurements that indicated atmospheric carbon dioxide had reached an average daily level in excess of 400 parts per million—a level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that is not believed to have been reached in the preceding three million years.
May 2013: Human causes of climate change
A survey has found that 97 percent of scientific studies on climate change conclude human activity, due to the consumption of fossil fuels, is causing global warming. The survey,published in Environmental Research Letters, examined the work of nearly 12,000 peer-reviewed research papers published over the last two decades. Of these, over 4,000 papers took a position on the causes of climate change, of which 0.7 percent disputed the consensus of anthropogenic-induced warming. A further 2.2 percent argued that the science is unclear one way or another. "Our findings prove that there is a strong scientific agreement about the cause of climate change," says survey director John Cook, "despite public perceptions to the contrary." Indeed, a public opinion survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in October 2012 reported that only 45 percent of Americans held the belief that "scientists agree Earth is getting warmer because of human activity."
April 2013: China to cut HCFCs
The Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol struck an agreement with the Chinese government on the elimination of the industrial production of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). In exchange for $385 million over a seventeen-year period, China committed to retiring all production capacity of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by 2030. Beijing also agreed to retire any surplus capacity of HCFCs that is not currently in use. China is the world's largest producer and consumer of HCFCs. Since ratification of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, state parties have eliminated ninety-seven percent of ODS, and HCFCs represent one of the last remaining sources of ozone pollution that the Protocol aims to curb.
April 2013: California-Canadian initiative
On April 22, the State of California officially linked its cap-and-trade program with a similar scheme in Quebec province. Established in 2006 under a landmark global warming law(AB 32), California's program places a price on carbon emissions and allows companies to buy and sell carbon credits issued at state auctions. Under the merger, which formally begins on January 1, 2014, California businesses will be able to use Quebec's permits and California's permits will be valid in Quebec.
Options for Strengthening the Climate Change Regime
Introduction
The multi-faceted threats posed by climate change demand policies that address both mitigation and adaptation. Operationally, this will require a variety of flexible partnerships among national, bilateral, and multilateral actors, and a combination of short-term and long-term strategies.
These recommendations reflect the views of Stewart M. Patrick, director of the program on international institutions and global governance.
While the Durban Platform, approved by nearly two hundred countries in December 2011, may have provided a small window of breathing room concerning the development of a successor accord to the Kyoto Protocol, much work remains to be done. In moving towards a post–Kyoto agreement due to come into force in 2020, the international community should remain cognizant of certain trends that emerged during and immediately after the COP-17.
This, for one, includes acknowledging growing cracks among countries in the developing world regarding accepting binding emissions targets—an issue of critical concern to small island developing states in the Pacific and other areas. These fissures should be explored as much as possible to both create a global consensus regarding the creation of major greenhouse gas emissions targets and to isolate intransigent countries. Second, the global financial crisis cannot become a catch-all excuse to avoid meeting pledges for global climate change finance mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund. While the $50 million in seed money promised during the COP-17 is an excellent start, more—much more—is needed as the environmental effects of climate change become increasingly apparent around the world. Importantly, the narrative among developed economies must change because waiting to act will be substantially more costly than action now. Third, the international community must not let its existing accomplishments on climate change—such as the Kyoto Protocol itself—fall by the wayside as it struggles to develop new alternatives for a comprehensive climate change accord. Canada's December 2011 decision to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol should be interpreted as a crystal clear warning that the agreement is increasingly at risk of unraveling. As a result, countries such as the United States, China, and India need to place a fresh emphasis on their commitments to combat climate change, including providing clear, reasonable, and practical indications as to their expectations for a post-Kyoto accord. Even though the Durban Platform's call for a 2020 accord—which would apply both to developed and developing states—with "legal force" does not necessarily imply "legally binding," the time for big emitters like the United States to simply stay the course on climate change has expired.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has come under fire on many fronts. Some have argued that too many nonadditional projects (those that would have reduced emissions even without the CDM) have been approved; others argue that the project approval process is too stringent. And others have argued that because it has no legal life beyond Kyoto, it will fail to bring about lasting results. These criticisms have on various occasions been right.
Scrapping the CDM entirely is not likely to be politically feasible, especially considering the COP-17 decision to extend the Kyoto Protocol for at least another five years. Reforming the CDM will thus be necessary to ensure that money is not wasted and that large volumes of offset credits remain available. The international community should reform CDM to focus on the least developed countries and on activities that are unquestionably additional. It should focus on sector-based trading for other countries. This could allow crediting for sectors that beat aggressive preset baselines, without penalizing them for exceeding those baselines. At the same time, the UNFCCC will need to work on streamlining the CDM approval process. Ideally, the CDM bureaucracy could be substantially reduced if CDM governance were shifted more to the countries providing funds.
The recent announcement of a year-long CDM reform consultation process process as well as the decision during the COP-17 in Durban to formally include carbon capture storage projects under the CDM are significant first steps. However, both must be followed by firm policy action to keep the CDM relevant and economically sustainable.
The failure to pass comprehensive U.S. climate legislation, with a sweeping carbon cap-and-trade at its base, is a significant setback to U.S. mitigation efforts. Cutting U.S. emissions remains an essential step toward a climate-change solution at home and abroad, providing not only an environmentally sound solution to the problem, but giving the United States leverage in international bargaining as well. The increasingly intractable position of the United States became more apparent during the COP-17 meeting in Durban. There, the United States faced nearly universal criticism for not showing the leadership necessary to address climate change.
While a cap-and-trade system remains ideal, deep cuts in U.S. emissions can be pursued in a variety of ways, including energy-efficiency regulations, subsidies for renewable energy, andtax incentives for low-carbon technologies. Effort to reach consensus on these solutions should be pursued in the short term, keeping in mind that a broad-based and economy-wide price on carbon is essential to driving the very deep emissions cuts that will be needed through 2050 and beyond at a reasonable economic cost.
Facing a divided Congress and significant pressure to reduce the federal deficit, President Obama seems to have limited options with regard to advancing an effective domestic climate change policy; nonetheless the picture is far from hopeless. one way for Obama to force progress is to issue more executive orders and administrative rulemakings to partially substitute for Congressional opposition to his climate and energy agenda. Working through the EPA and the Clean Air Act, he could enact tougher rules that would cut carbon pollution from power plants and mitigate the potential effects of the failure to enact a national cap-and-trade program. An agreement reached with the auto industry in July 2011 to double fuel standards to fifty-four miles per gallon by 2025 is also a step in the right direction, provided that its stipulations are enforced. Other significant measures the administration can take include government procurement of renewable energy and energy-efficient products and services, and reductions in subsidies for fossil fuel-related research and extraction. Perhaps one of the most significant steps President Obama can take towards realizing his climate change policy is to strike a deal with China to reduce global emissions of CO2. The two nations combined account for 40 percent of the world's carbon pollution, so a bilateral agreement could mollify Obama's opponents in Congress and encourage other nations to follow suit.
In the longer term, the United States and its international partners should consider the following steps:
Countries will not make strong efforts to reduce emissions unless they are confident that others are playing their part. Nor will wealthier countries provide financial or technological assistance to poorer counterparts unless they are confident that the efforts they support will actually be implemented.
This demands robust institutional capacity to verify that countries are making the cuts and investing in the emissions-cutting actions that they claim to be. The precise approach to this could take multiple forms, with the task falling primarily to the international level at one extreme, and domestic institutions at the other. At a minimum, an international institution will need to aggregate national-level reporting; this might usefully happen under the aegis of the UNFCCC. Other lessons in monitoring and verification might be learned from experience with the WTO, IMF, and OECD.
Institutions that support global economic development have a large potential role in promoting low-carbon growth and adaptation to climate change. The World Bank, along with the regional development banks, has unique capacity to mobilize large amounts of capital for the sorts of investments that will be needed in low-carbon infrastructure. Several UN organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program and United Nations Environment Program, lack the ability to handle such large infrastructure projects but can play a major role in building relevant capacity in developing countries. All these organizations would benefit from both clear strategies for supporting climate action and increased related funding.
They might also, more controversially, consider promoting policy shifts through conditionality on their assistance. For example, the World Bank might condition assistance in increasing energy supply on efforts to moderate demand through subsidy reform. Such steps would be difficult politically but would not be unprecedented.
International financial transfers in support of low-carbon development have occurred principally through carbon finance (i.e., offsets). Yet offsets are often an inefficient way of financially supporting low-carbon development. Many countries lack the capacity to administer robust offset systems yet could benefit from financial support for emissions-cutting activities. Offset schemes also often overpay, sometimes massively, for reductions; dedicated funds could remove that waste. Funds can also be targeted at eliminating specific problems that stand in the way of private financial flows, by offering tailored products like risk guarantees and concessional loans. Funds can also target opportunities that are difficult to quantify for the purposes of offsets, such as investments in public transportation and long-distance grid infrastructure, or avoided deforestation, where measuring emissions changes is difficult.
Dealing with climate change will require high-level political leadership and deal-making of a sort that is difficult to achieve through formal negotiations with the 194 parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change by dedicated climate diplomats alone. Smaller gatherings that include heads of state and powerful cabinet ministers have the potential to unlock less rigid forms of cooperation and to find opportunities to trade across issue areas.
Such meetings also provide a regular spotlight that can help hold leaders accountable for past promises in the absence of strong formal compliance mechanisms. The Group of Twenty (G20) has effectively replaced the Group of Eight (G8) as the main multilateral consultative forum for economic decision-making. Climate issues will largely be transferred there, though in the short term the G20 will remain primarily focused on finance as it was during its most recent summit in November 2011. The United States and other big emitters should likewise continue regular meetings of the Major Economies Forum, as a minilateral negotiating framework parallel—and complementary—to the ongoing UNFCCC process.
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